Peacemaking among inconsistent rationalities?
Kacelnik, Schuck-Paim and Pompilio (this volume, p. 377) show that rationality axioms from economics are neither necessary nor sufficient to guarantee that animal behavior is biologically adaptive. To illustrate that biological adaptiveness does not imply conformity with the consistency axioms of economics, Kacelnik et al describe animals that sensibly experiment with actions yielding sub-maximum levels of short-term energy intake to monitor their environments for change, leading to apparently intransitive patterns of choice that are nevertheless biologically adaptive. Invalidating the converse claim that economic rationality implies biological adaptiveness is Kacelnik et al’s example of female ruffs that are worse off when they conform to the constant-ratio rule, frequently interpreted as a normative consistency requirement of economic rationality. Together, the two examples demonstrate that axiomatic norms are both unnecessary and insufficient for determining whether a particular behavior is biologically adaptive. Additionally, Kacelnik et al call into question what has been reported in the animal behavior literature as preference reversals, such as risk attitudes among wild rufous hummingbirds or the food-hoarding propensities of grey jays. Kacelnik et al attribute apparent reversals to state-dependent fitness functions modulated by subtle differences in the training phase of animal experiments. For example, animals trained on menus that include a strictly dominated option will tend to have lower accumulated energy reserves and therefore exhibit systematically different patterns of choice––not because they fail to maximize, but because their training has induced systematically different nutritional states. Another possible explanation for preference reversals in animal studies with strictly dominated, or “decoy” options is that menus containing dominated items may convey valid information about future opportunities (Houston and McNamara, 1999). If menus are correlated through time, then menus with inferior options today predict scarcity in the future and imply a distinct optimal course of action, in violation of regularity assumptions that posit invariance with respect to the inclusion of strictly dominated alternatives. In environments with payoff structures that can be modeled as cooperative games, a family’s best response sometimes requires individual family members to behave suboptimally as part of a diversification strategy that reduces the risk of reproductive failure (Hutchinson, 1996). Futhermore, theoretical biologists have documented the fragility of expected fitness maximizing behaviour with respect to the assumption of stable environments. Once the model allows for shocks to the environment’s stochastic structure, simple behavior rules that are suboptimal (in terms of expected fitness) when viewed narrowly from the perspective of unchanging payoffs in a fixed environment may outperform rules based on maximazation within a static small world (Bookstaber and Langsam, 1985).
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Publication status:||Published in In Englel, C. and Daston, L. (eds,), Is There Value in Inconsistency (2006): pp. 421-433|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999.
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Simon, Herbert A, 1978. "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 1-16, May.
- Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, 2003. "Libertarian Paternalism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 175-179, May.
- Amartya Sen, 1997. "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 745-780, July.
- Amartya Sen, 1996. "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1766, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Sen, A., 1996. "Maximisation and the Act of Choice," Papers 270, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
- Gabriel D. Carroll & James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, 2009. "Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1639-1674.
- Gabriel D. Carroll & James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte Madrian & Andrew Metrick, 2005. "Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions," NBER Working Papers 11074, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte Madrian & Andrew Metrick, 2005. "Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000488, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Carroll, Gabriel D. & Choi, James J. & Laibson, David I. & Madrian, Brigitte & Metrick, Andrew, 2009. "Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions," Scholarly Articles 4686776, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alan Kirman, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-156.
- Vernon L. Smith, 2003. "Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 465-508, June.
- Smith, Vernon L., 2002. "Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2002-7, Nobel Prize Committee.
- John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
- Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 186-191, May.
- Sen, Amartya, 1993. "Internal Consistency of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 495-521, May.
- Daniel Kahneman, 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1449-1475, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:26588. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.