IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/2384.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału
[Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of mines and power plants. Part I – Split of profit proposals]

Author

Listed:
  • Jurdziak, Leszek

Abstract

Different structures of lignite mines and power stations, which have appeared on the Polish market as a result of its transformation and the privatisation, were discussed. The attention is focused on the fact that the practice is overtaking the theory because there is lack of models of functioning of such structures. A model of cooperation between the mine and the power station was worked out for the established amount of coal what can describe the situation of particular ultimate pit choice (in long run) or realization of supplies of the constant amount of lignite in frames of the long-term contract (in short run e.g. one of year). It is proposed to treat a negotiation of the lignite price as a constant sum game and a lignite price as the determinant of the total profit division. The choice of lignite price between prices outlining break-even points of the mine and the power station determines the distribution of the profit to both sides. It is similar to the contract curve in the classical bilateral monopoly model. Ten different methods of the profit division are proposed. Argumentation speaking for proposed solutions was presented favouring the pro-posal of equal profit margins calculated without the costs of fuel purchase.

Suggested Citation

  • Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału
    [Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of mines and pow
    ," MPRA Paper 2384, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Mar 2007.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2384
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2384/1/MPRA_paper_2384.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej," MPRA Paper 478, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Feb 2000.
    2. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Odkrywkowa kopalnia węgla brunatnego i elektrownia jako bilateralny monopol w ujęciu klasycznym," MPRA Paper 530, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Oct 2006.
    3. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2005. "Czy integracja pionowa kopalń odkrywkowych węgla z elektrowniami jest korzystna i dla kogo?," MPRA Paper 534, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 31 Mar 2005.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część III – Obliczenia cen i zysków dla hipotetycznych danych
      [Lignite price as a determinant of the split of pr
      ," MPRA Paper 2388, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Mar 2007.
    2. Jurdziak, Leszek, 2006. "Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego
      [Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of min
      ," MPRA Paper 2385, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 Mar 2007.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bilateral monopoly; pit optimisation; bargaining; price negotiation; fair division; Nash bargaining solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; lignite price; lignite mine; lignite power plant; coal mine; coal power plant;

    JEL classification:

    • R32 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L72 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:2384. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.