Direct and indirect state ownership on banks in Russia
This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.
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- Fungáčová, Zuzana & Poghosyan, Tigran, 2011.
"Determinants of bank interest margins in Russia: Does bank ownership matter?,"
Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 481-495.
- Fungáčová, Zuzana & Poghosyan, Tigran, 2009. "Determinants of bank interest margins in Russia : Does bank ownership matter?," BOFIT Discussion Papers 22/2009, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
- repec:hrv:faseco:30747188 is not listed on IDEAS
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- Glushkova, Ekaterina & Vernikov, Andrei, 2009. "How big is the visible hand of the state in the Russian banking industry?," MPRA Paper 15563, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Vernikov, Andrei, 2009. "Russian banking : The state makes a comeback?," BOFIT Discussion Papers 24/2009, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
- Zuzana Fungácová & Laura Solanko & Laurent Weill, 2010. "Market power in the russian banking industry," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 124, pages 127-146.
- Zuzana Fungacova & Laura Solanko & Laurent Weill, 2010. "Market Power in the Russian Banking Industry," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2010-09, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
- Fungáčová, Zuzana & Solanko, Laura & Weill, Laurent, 2010. "Market power in the Russian banking industry," BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2010, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
- Vernikov, Andrei V., 2007. "Russia' banking sector transition : where to?," BOFIT Discussion Papers 5/2007, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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