Эволюция Банков В Х- И Y-Экономиках
[Evolution of banks in economies of X-type and Y-type]
We compare banking in economic systems of different type, namely X-type (redistributive economy) and Y-type (market economy). In an X-type economic system banking has a peculiar institutional design and is organized “top-down”, whereas in a Y-type market economy we see a “bottom-up model” of banking system. We suggest that in countries where X-type economy prevails the private banking activity is merely a complementary institution to centralized finance and credit allocation. We test this hypothesis with historical and contemporary evidence from Russia as well as from China. Russia’s experiment with bank de-nationalization did not produce a well functioning system of privately owned banks. Current trends in the Russian banking may be deemed consistent with the direction of evolution of economic institutions in the country including broader state ownership on core industrial assets. The share of state-controlled banks keeps growing to have reached 54 percent of total banking assets. We conclude that the complex and uncoordinated nature of change in Russian banking reflects a search for a better balance between redistributive and market instruments and an institutional model of banking that would fit this country more organically.
|Date of creation:||May 2010|
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