Contrat de travail et précarisation : une modélisation de l’information asymétrique d’une situation atypique, cas des pays pauvres et en développement
[Employment contract and insecurity jobs: asymmetric information modelling of atypical situation, case of poor and less developed countries]
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Moroccan Labour Market; Insecure Jobs; Adverse Selection; Principal/Agent Theory; Poor and Developing Countries.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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