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Do banks discriminate sectoral real investment?

  • Maudos, Joaquin
  • Pérez, Francisco
  • Quesada, Javier

Using new sectoral data on Spanish capital stock, real investment and credit we check for the presence of bank preferences for lending to particular branches of the economy. We show that these subsectors share specific characteristics in the levels and components of their cost of use of capital. We find a “preferred habitat” for banks in three sectors: Housing, Real Estate and Construction. Also, commercial banks appear to be more sensitive towards credit demand by nonfinancial firms than savings banks. The latter ones concentrate their lending into the three sectors mentioned above.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15868/1/MPRA_paper_15868.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15868.

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Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision: 2005
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15868
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  1. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Gorton, G. & Khan, J., 1992. "The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, Collateral, and Renegociation," RCER Working Papers 327, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  3. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. " Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-87, September.
  4. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. " Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-400, September.
  5. Boot, Arnoud W. A. & Thakor, Anjan V. & Udell, Gregory F., 1991. "Credible commitments, contract enforcement problems and banks: Intermediation as credibility assurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 605-632, June.
  6. Michael Faulkender & Mitchell A. Petersen, 2006. "Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital Structure?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(1), pages 45-79.
  7. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, June.
  8. Jacob L. Vigdor, 2004. "Liquidity Constraints and Housing Prices: Theory and Evidence from the VA Mortgage," NBER Working Papers 10611, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
  10. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
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