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Sleeping with the Enemy: A General Equilibrium Approach

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  • Loureiro, Paulo Roberto Amorim

Abstract

This paper develops a general equilibrium model of domestic violence grounded in household bargaining and economic dependence. Inspired by the dynamics portrayed in the film *Sleeping with the Enemy* (1991), the model incorporates exit constraints, enforcement, and social norms as determinants of women’s decisions regarding labor participation and relationship continuity. The analysis shows how insufficient enforcement and limited outside opportunities trap victims in stable but inefficient equilibria characterized by violence and dependency. Comparative statics demonstrate that welfare policies such as shelters, transfers, and employment support shift equilibrium outcomes toward safety and self-sufficiency. The results highlight the role of public intervention in restoring efficiency and individual autonomy when private bargaining fails due to asymmetric power and coercion.

Suggested Citation

  • Loureiro, Paulo Roberto Amorim, 2025. "Sleeping with the Enemy: A General Equilibrium Approach," MPRA Paper 126612, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:126612
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    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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