When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies? A Theory of Incentives with Fear-Based Content
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- repec:cup:apsrev:v:99:y:2005:i:01:p:1-15_05 is not listed on IDEAS
- McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
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Keywordsemotions; behavioral economics; game theory; political science; incentives;
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2006-12-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2006-12-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2006-12-04 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2006-12-04 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-12-04 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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