Inside the capitalist firm: An evolutionary theory of the principal agent-relation
This book deals with the inner life of the capitalist firm. There we find numerous conflicts, the most important of which concerns the individual employment relationship which is understood as a principal-agent problem between the manager, the principal, who issues orders that are to be followed by the employee, the agent. Whereas economic theory traditionally analyses this relationship from a (normative) perspective of the firm in order to support the manager in finding ways to influence the behavior of the employees, such that the latter – ideally – act on behalf of their superior, this book takes a neutral stance. It focusses on explaining individual behavioral patterns and the resulting interactions between the actors in the firm by taking sociological, institutional, and above all, psychological research into consideration. In doing so, insights are gained which challenge many assertions economists take for granted.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2013|
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