Are "Gangstas" Peacocks? The Handicap Principle and Illicit Markets
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- Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
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KeywordsIllegal behaviour and the enforcement of law; Information; Uncertainty;
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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