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Bargaining Between Retailers and their Suppliers


  • Howard Smith
  • John Thanassoulis


This paper surveys new research concerning bargaining within supply chains and its implications for buyer power. The paper explores the implications of the research on supermarket supply chains for primary, secondary and private-label branded goods. The empirical base in support of the theories is also discussed. This paper is an initial draft of a chapter for the book "Private Labels, Brands and Competition Policy" (OUP) edited by Ariel Ezrachi and Ulf Bernitz.

Suggested Citation

  • Howard Smith & John Thanassoulis, 2008. "Bargaining Between Retailers and their Suppliers," Economics Series Working Papers 388, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:388

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Davis & Alan Reilly, 2010. "Market power, market outcomes, and remedies in the UK groceries market," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 41(s1), pages 93-108, November.
    2. Bacchiega, Emanuele & Bonroy, Olivier & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2016. "Contract contingency in vertically related markets," 149th Seminar, October 27-28, 2016, Rennes, France 244955, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    3. Heimeshoff, Ulrich & Klein, Gordon J., 2013. "Bargaining power and local heroes," DICE Discussion Papers 87, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    4. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Apostolis Pavlou, 2014. "Foreign Direct Investment Modes and Local Backward Linkages," CESifo Working Paper Series 4623, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Aparicio-Fenoll, Ainhoa, 2015. "The effect of product market competition on job security," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 145-159.

    More about this item


    Bargaining; Supply Chains; Supermarkets; Branded Goods; Private Label Goods; Buyer Power; Waterbed Effects;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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