Welfare Analysis of Free Entry in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
This paper presents a welfare analysis of free entry equilibrium in dynamic general equilibrium environments with oligopolistic competition. First, we show that a marginal decrease in the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium improves social welfare. Second, we show that if a government can control the number of entrants intertemporally so as to maximize the level of social welfare, the number of entrants under free entry may be less than the second-best number of entrants. Capital accumulation plays an important role in determining whether excess entry occurs.
|Date of creation:||May 2011|
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- Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe & Lloyd-Braga, Teresa, 2005. "Non-linear endogenous fluctuations with free entry and variable markups," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 847-871, May.
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