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Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry: The Case of Heterogeneous Fixed Costs

Author

Listed:
  • Ronald B. Davies

    (University of Oregon Economics Department)

  • Carsten Eckel

    (University of Goettingen)

Abstract

This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium wages across countries and equilibrium prices. These in turn influence the equilibrium number of firms. From the social planner's perspective, optimal tax rates are harmonized, providing the optimal number of firms, and set such that income is efficiently distributed between private and public consumption. As is common in tax competition models, in the Nash equilibrium tax rates are inefficiently low, yielding underprovision of public goods. Furthermore, there exist a variety of situations in which equilibrium tax rates differ. As a result, too many firms enter the market as governments compete to be the low-tax, high-wage country. This illustrates a new distortion from tax competition and provides an additional benefit from tax harmonization.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald B. Davies & Carsten Eckel, 2007. "Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry: The Case of Heterogeneous Fixed Costs," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2007-7, University of Oregon Economics Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2007-7
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    File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2007-7_Davies_EndogEnt.pdf
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    2. Daniela Federici & Valentino Parisi, 2012. "Corporate Taxation and Exports," Working Papers 2012-01, Universita' di Cassino, Dipartimento di Economia e Giurisprudenza.
    3. Ronald B. Davies & Carsten Eckel, 2010. "Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 77-102, February.
    4. Peter Egger & Simon Loretz, 2010. "Homogeneous Profit Tax Effects for Heterogeneous Firms?," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(8), pages 1023-1041, August.
    5. Becker, Johannes & Fuest, Clemens, 2010. "EU regional policy and tax competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 150-161, January.
    6. Krautheim, Sebastian & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim, 2011. "Heterogeneous firms, ‘profit shifting’ FDI and international tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 122-133.
    7. Matthew T. Cole, 2009. "The choice of modeling firm heterogeneity and trade restrictions," Working Papers 200920, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    8. Federici, Daniela & Parisi, Valentino & Ferrante, Francesco, 2020. "Heterogeneous firms, corporate taxes and export behavior: A firm-level investigation for Italy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 98-112.
    9. Daniela Federici & Valentino Parisi, 2014. "Corporate Taxation and Exports: Evidence from Italian Firm-Level Data," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 4, pages 23-38, May.
    10. Matthew Cole, 2011. "Not all trade restrictions are created equally," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 147(3), pages 411-427, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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