Large Non-Anonymous Repeated Games
Saborian , following Green , studies a class of repeated games where a player's payoff depends on his stage action and an anonymous aggregate outcome, and shows that long-run players behave myopically in any equilibrium of such games. In this paper we extend Sabourian's results to games where the aggregate outcome is not necessarily an anonymous function of players' actions, and where players strategies may depend non-anonymously on signals of other players' behavior. Our argument also provides a conceptually simpler proof of Green and Sabourian's analysis, showing how their basic result is driven by bounds on how many pivotal players there can be in a game.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1998|
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|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014|
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- Drew Fudenberg, 1995.
"When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?,"
1114, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1998. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," Scholarly Articles 3203775, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible," Levine's Working Paper Archive 180, David K. Levine.
- Sabourian, Hamid, 1990. "Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 92-110, June.
- Green, Edward J., 1980. "Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 155-182, April.
- George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 351-367.
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