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Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection

Author

Listed:
  • Florian Ederer
  • Weicheng Min

Abstract

How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as this probability is sufficiently small, the Sender’s and the Receiver’s equilibrium payoffs are unaffected by the presence of lie detection because the Sender simply compensates by lying more. However, when the lie detection probability is sufficiently high, the Sender’s equilibrium payoff decreases and the Receiver’s equilibrium payoff increases with the lie detection probability. We explore several extensions including partial commitment, general state and action spaces, and different detection technologies and show that our model’s main insights continue to hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Ederer & Weicheng Min, 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection," NBER Working Papers 30065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30065
    Note: IO POL
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    Cited by:

    1. de Haan, Evert & Padigar, Manjunath & El Kihal, Siham & Kübler, Raoul & Wieringa, Jaap E., 2024. "Unstructured data research in business: Toward a structured approach," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    2. Andrew T Little, 2023. "Bayesian explanations for persuasion," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 147-181, July.
    3. repec:osf:osfxxx:ygw8e_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Preyas S. Desai & Jessie Liu, 2025. "Reactive Marketing and the Co-Production of (In)Authenticity," Papers 2511.16793, arXiv.org.
    5. Arrora. Falak, 2025. "Screening Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1586, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    6. Zhou, Junya, 2023. "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1100-1142.
    7. Luo, Zhaotian & Rozenas, Arturas, 2025. "Lying in persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 93-112.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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