Conforming and Non-conforming Peer Effects in Vaccination Decisions
Traditional economic models of vaccination assume that agents free-ride on the vaccination decision of others. These models show that private vaccination rates are always below the social optimal and even large subsidies cannot achieve disease eradication. In this paper, we build a model where in addition to the desire to free-ride, agents have a desire to conform to the vaccination decisions of their peers. In this model privately optimal vaccination rates can be higher or lower than the social optimal and thus subsidies for vaccination are not always optimal. However, in certain cases, even small subsidies can achieve disease eradication.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19528. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.