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CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation, and the Crisis of 2007-2009

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  • Richard Stanton
  • Nancy Wallace

Abstract

This paper analyzes the performance of the commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) market before and during the recent financial crisis. Using a comprehensive sample of CMBS deals from 1996 to 2008, we show that (unlike the residential mortgage market) the loans underlying CMBS did not significantly change their characteristics during this period, commercial lenders did not change the way they priced a given loan, defaults remained in line with their levels during the entire 1970s and 1980s and, overall, the CMBS and CMBX markets performed as normal during the financial crisis (at least by the standards of other recent market downturns). We show that the recent collapse of the CMBS market was caused primarily by the rating agencies allowing subordination levels to fall to levels that provided insufficient protection to supposedly "safe" tranches. This ratings inflation in turn allowed financial firms to engage in ratings arbitrage.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, 2010. "CMBS Subordination, Ratings Inflation, and the Crisis of 2007-2009," NBER Working Papers 16206, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16206
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Benmelech, Efraim & Dlugosz, Jennifer, 2009. "The alchemy of CDO credit ratings," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 617-634, July.
    2. Bank for International Settlements, 2008. "Ratings in structured finance: what went wrong and what can be done to address shortcomings?," CGFS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 32.
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    Cited by:

    1. Massa, Massimo & Manconi, Alberto & Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "Canary in a Coalmine: Securities Lending Predicting the Performance of Securitized Bonds," CEPR Discussion Papers 11993, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2013. "A Model of Shadow Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(4), pages 1331-1363, August.
    3. Kallapur, Sanjay & Khizer, Abdul & Manchiraju, Hariom & Vijayaraghavan, Rajesh, 2025. "Does observability of ratings shopping improve ratings quality?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1).
    4. Erwan Quintin & Dean Corbae, 2016. "Asset Quality Dynamics," 2016 Meeting Papers 418, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, 2012. "Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 1-38, October.
    6. Li, Sanxi & Sun, Hailin & Wang, Tong & Yu, Jun, 2016. "Assortative matching and risk sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 248-275.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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