Coalition structures induced by the strength of a graph
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Michel Grabisch & Alexandre Skoda, 2011. "Coalition structures induced by the strength of a graph," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00639685, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Michel Grabisch, 2013.
"The core of games on ordered structures and graphs,"
Annals of Operations Research,
Springer, vol. 204(1), pages 33-64, April.
- Michel Grabisch, 2009. "The core of games on ordered structures and graphs," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00445171, HAL.
- Michel Grabisch, 2013. "The core of games on ordered structures and graphs," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00803233, HAL.
- van den Nouweland, Anne & Borm, Peter, 1991. "On the Convexity of Communication Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(4), pages 421-430.
More about this item
KeywordsCommunication networks; coalition structures; cooperative games;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2011-11-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2011-11-14 (Network Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11059. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label) or (Joanne Lustig). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cenp1fr.html .