An Axiomatic Model of Social Adaptive Behavior
I replace the assumption that an agent makes an optimal choice by an assumption that the agent executes a computational algorithm directed at finding a choice that is good at the time the choice is made. The algorithm utilizes the individual's own information, and information about choices of other members of society. It is shown that under some regularity conditions any such algorithm can be decomposed into generalized gradient dynamics, direct imitation, experimentation, and imitation of scope.
|Date of creation:||2001|
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- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114.
- Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1998. "Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(4), pages 828-853, August.
- Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
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