IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mit/sloanp/7391.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Investment Banking and Analyst Objectivity: Evidence from Forecasts and Recommendations of Analysts Affiliated with M&A Advisors

Author

Listed:
  • Kolasinski, Adam
  • Kothari, S.P.

Abstract

Previous research finds some evidence that analysts affiliated with equity underwriters issue more optimistic earnings growth forecasts and optimistic recommendations of client stock than unaffiliated analysts. Unfortunately, these studies are unable to discriminate between three competing hypotheses for the apparent optimism. Under the bribery hypothesis, underwriting clients, with the promise of underwriting fees, coax analysts to compromise their objectivity. The execution-related conflict of hypothesis postulates that the investment banks employing analysts who are more bullish on a particular stock are better able to execute the deal, and so the banks pressure their analysts to be bullish in order to enhance their execution ability. Finally, the selection bias hypothesis postulates that analysts are objective, but because of the enhanced execution ability, banks with more optimistic analysts are more likely to get selected as underwriters. We test these hypotheses in a previously unexplored setting, namely M&A activities. Depending on whether an analyst is affiliated with the target or the acquirer and whether the analyst report is about the target or the acquirer, the hypotheses predict analyst optimism in some cases and pessimism in other. Therefore, examining the issue of analyst bias in the M&A context allows us to shed some light on alternative explanations for the impact of analyst affiliation on the properties of analyst forecasts and recommendations.

Suggested Citation

  • Kolasinski, Adam & Kothari, S.P., 2004. "Investment Banking and Analyst Objectivity: Evidence from Forecasts and Recommendations of Analysts Affiliated with M&A Advisors," Working papers 4467-04, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:7391
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7391
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lin, Hsiou-wei & McNichols, Maureen F., 1998. "Underwriting relationships, analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 101-127, February.
    2. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-479, June.
    3. Trueman, Brett, 1994. "Analyst Forecasts and Herding Behavior," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 97-124.
    4. Welch, Ivo, 2000. "Herding among security analysts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 369-396, December.
    5. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-686.
    6. repec:bla:joares:v:35:y:1997:i::p:167-199 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ljungqvist, Alexander & Marston, Felicia & Starks, Laura T. & Wei, Kelsey D. & Yan, Hong, 2007. "Conflicts of interest in sell-side research and the moderating role of institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 420-456, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Finance; Investment Banking; Analysts; Conlict of Interest;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:7391. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ssmitus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.