Bundling and International Market Segmentation
This paper shows how firms, by bundling their products with nontradables, may contribute to the segmentation of international oligopoly markets. The authors develop a simple example with two products: one that is homogeneous across markets and one that is bundled with a nontradable, e.g., local services. Integration of the markets for the homogeneous product yields the expected price equalization across markets. However, integration of the markets for bundled products leaves the economy entirely unaffected. Hence, the standard methodology of comparing a 'segmented' and an 'integrated' equilibrium would exaggerate the effects of integration in this economy. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1994|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mie:wpaper:369. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (FSPP Webmaster)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.