Economics of Science
In this paper we argue that the incentive scheme faced by scientists induces them to promote their activity, publishing on-line their work-in-progress, participating or organising meetings and so on. Such actions produce a huge amount of externalities that may make easier for others to deal with the same topics. Recognizing this influence, we present four game theoretic settings which aim to replicate same features of the research world, such as the "fashions" or the separation between "common researchers" and "stars".
|Date of creation:||Aug 2002|
|Date of revision:||Aug 2002|
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