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Product market competition and collateralized debt

Author

Listed:
  • Vittoria Cerasi
  • Alessandro Fedele
  • Raffaele Miniaci

Abstract

This paper presents a model where bank credit depends upon borrowers.product market structure. We show that a larger number of competitors in the industry may increase credit availability by enhancing the resale value of the collateralized productive assets. We also study how this bene.t of competition is affected by the existence of outsiders willing to bid for the collateralized productive assets of the insiders. Our model encompasses the standard case of Cournot competition either when the default probability goes to zero or when there are multiple outsiders bidding for the productive assets. We test the empirical implications of the theoretical analysis exploiting information on the access to finance of small and medium Italian firms and find supportive evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Vittoria Cerasi & Alessandro Fedele & Raffaele Miniaci, 2013. "Product market competition and collateralized debt," Working Papers 238, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:238
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    File URL: http://dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper238.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. " Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-1366, September.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    3. Almeida, Heitor & Campello, Murillo & Hackbarth, Dirk, 2011. "Liquidity mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 526-558.
    4. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-381, July.
    5. Benmelech, Efraim & Bergman, Nittai K., 2009. "Collateral pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3), pages 339-360, March.
    6. Cerasi Vittoria & Fedele Alessandro, 2011. "Does Product Market Competition Increase Credit Availability?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-27, July.
    7. Cerasi, Vittoria & Chizzolini, Barbara & Ivaldi, Marc, 2009. "The Impact of Mergers on the Degree of Competition in the Banking Industry," IDEI Working Papers 582, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 07 Jun 2012.
    8. Efraim Benmelech & Nittai K. Bergman, 2011. "Bankruptcy and the Collateral Channel," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(2), pages 337-378, April.
    9. Massimo Colombo & Luca Grilli, 2007. "Funding Gaps? Access To Bank Loans By High-Tech Start-Ups," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 25-46, June.
    10. Gavazza, Alessandro, 2010. "Asset liquidity and financial contracts: Evidence from aircraft leases," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 62-84, January.
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    1. repec:kap:sbusec:v:49:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11187-017-9838-x is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    collateralized loans; product market competition; productive assets resale value;

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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