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Electricity Prices and Elections in Québec


  • BERNARD, Jean-Thomas


  • GORDON, Stephen
  • TREMBLAY, Josée


This study examines the role of elections in determining electricity prices in Quebec. The legislation governing Hydro-Quebec is used to develop a model incorporating its stated policy objectives and the partisan interests of the governing party. Bayesian methods are used to incorporate available nonsample information to test the restrictions imposed by the strategic pricing hypothesis. The data provide broad but limited support for the null. Electricity prices appear to be consistent with the behavior of governments who wish to manipulate electricity prices for partisan gain and who also wish to avoid detection.
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  • BERNARD, Jean-Thomas & GORDON, Stephen & TREMBLAY, Josée, 1995. "Electricity Prices and Elections in Québec," Cahiers de recherche 9501, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  • Handle: RePEc:lvl:laeccr:9501

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau, 1994. "Time inconsistency as a rationale for public unemployment insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 1(2), pages 107-126, October.
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    4. Rogers, Carol Ann, 1987. "Expenditure taxes, income taxes, and time-inconsistency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 215-230, March.
    5. Flam, Harry & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E. O., 1983. "Optimal subsidies to declining industries : Efficiency and equity considerations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 327-345, December.
    6. Fischer, Stanley, 1980. "Dynamic inconsistency, cooperation and the benevolent dissembling government," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 93-107, May.
    7. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mirnezami, Seyed Reza, 2014. "Electricity inequality in Canada: Should pricing reforms eliminate subsidies to encourage efficient usage?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 36-43.
    2. Bernard, Jean-Thomas, 1999. "Le marché québécois de l’électricité : rétrospective et voies de l’avenir," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(4), pages 673-694, décembre.
    3. Min, Brian & Golden, Miriam, 2014. "Electoral cycles in electricity losses in India," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 619-625.
    4. C. Robert Clark & Andrew Leach, 2007. "The Potential for Electricity Market Restructuring in Quebec," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 33(1), pages 1-20, March.
    5. Goto, Mika & Karolyi, G. Andrew, 2004. "Understanding Electricity Price Volatility within and across Markets," Working Paper Series 2004-12, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.

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