Electricity Prices and Elections in Quebec
This study examines the role of elections in determining electricity prices in Quebec. The legislation governing Hydro-Quebec is used to develop a model incorporating its stated policy objectives and the partisan interests of the governing party. Bayesian methods are used to incorporate available nonsample information to test the restrictions imposed by the strategic pricing hypothesis. The data provide broad but limited support for the null. Electricity prices appear to be consistent with the behavior of governments who wish to manipulate electricity prices for partisan gain and who also wish to avoid detection.
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Volume (Year): 30 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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