IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kue/dpaper/e-10-003.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Model for Bank’s Optimal Asset Securitization Program

Author

Listed:
  • Masahiko Egami
  • Kaoru Hosono

Abstract

We propose a framework to examine banks’ asset securitization program. It provides a comprehensive view that explains various separate findings and claims in the literature. We derive optimal timing and quantity of banks’ asset securitization by explicitly incorporating stochastic asset returns and leverage constraints. We also quantify how much additional value can be created by asset securitization program, which gives some insights into why banks securitize assets. We further conduct some comparative analysis by varying the asset quality and economic environment, obtaining results that can account for the actual securitization trends including the bubble and crisis periods. Our empirical analysis using a Japanese data set also provide evidences that are consistent with our theoretical implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiko Egami & Kaoru Hosono, 2010. "A Model for Bank’s Optimal Asset Securitization Program," Discussion papers e-10-003, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
  • Handle: RePEc:kue:dpaper:e-10-003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/projectcenter/Paper/e-10-003.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2009. "Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(6), pages 2201-2238, June.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1992. " Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1343-1366, September.
    3. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. " Security Design," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1349-1378, September.
    4. Keys, Benjamin J. & Mukherjee, Tanmoy & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2009. "Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 700-720, July.
    5. Greenbaum, Stuart I. & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Bank funding modes : Securitization versus deposits," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 379-401, September.
    6. James, Christopher, 1988. "The use of loan sales and standby letters of credit by commercial banks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 395-422.
    7. Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2009. "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 77-100, Winter.
    8. Lockwood, Larry J. & Rutherford, Ronald C. & Herrera, Martin J., 1996. "Wealth effects of asset securitization," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 151-164, January.
    9. Adrian, Tobias & Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Liquidity and leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 418-437, July.
    10. Pennacchi, George G, 1988. " Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(2), pages 375-396, June.
    11. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. " Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    12. Riddiough, Timothy J., 1997. "Optimal Design and Governance of Asset-Backed Securities," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 121-152, April.
    13. Brent Ambrose & Michael LaCour-Little & Anthony Sanders, 2005. "Does Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, Reputation, or Asymmetric Information Drive Securitization?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 28(1), pages 113-133, October.
    14. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asset securitization program; Leverage; Impulse control; Bubble and crisis;

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kue:dpaper:e-10-003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Graduate School of Economics Project Center). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fekyojp.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.