IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ivi/wpasad/2000-16.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Is Regionalism Better For Economic Integration? Nations, Regions, And Risk Sharing

Author

Listed:
  • Ignacio Ortuño Ortín

    (Universidad de Alicante)

  • Jaume Sempere

    (El Colegio de México)

Abstract

Our analysis yields some conclusions about the political role of regions in the formation of supranational economic areas, which turns out to be quite different from the role of nations. The claim that regions have more incentives than nations to attain a fiscal agreement implying full economic integration is likely to be correct when nations are economic stable arrangements, i.e. when the rich region of a nation is not "exploited" by the poor region. When, on the other hand, it is not on the interest of a rich region to be part of a nation, attempts to achieve full economic integration among a group of nations is more likely to be successful if nations, instead of regions, are the decision makers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ignacio Ortuño Ortín & Jaume Sempere, 2000. "Is Regionalism Better For Economic Integration? Nations, Regions, And Risk Sharing," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-16, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-16
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2000-16.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2000
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alesina, Alberto & Wacziarg, Romain, 1999. "Is Europe going too far?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-42, December.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    3. Forni, Mario & Reichlin, Lucrezia, 1999. "Risk and potential insurance in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1237-1256, June.
    4. David E. Wildasin, 2005. "Fiscal Competition," Working Papers 2005-05, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    5. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Lawrence F. Katz, 1992. "Regional Evolutions," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 23(1), pages 1-76.
    6. Wildasin, David E, 1995. " Factor Mobility, Risk and Redistribution in the Welfare State," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 527-546, December.
    7. Friend, Irwin & Blume, Marshall E, 1975. "The Demand for Risky Assets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 900-922, December.
    8. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-646, May.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Wacziarg, Romain, 1998. "Openness, country size and government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 305-321, September.
    10. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 979-1009, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federalism; Fiscal coinsurance; Migration.;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2000-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Departamento de Edición) or (Hassan Zaidi). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ievages.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.