Is Regionalism Better For Economic Integration? Nations, Regions, And Risk Sharing
Our analysis yields some conclusions about the political role of regions in the formation of supranational economic areas, which turns out to be quite different from the role of nations. The claim that regions have more incentives than nations to attain a fiscal agreement implying full economic integration is likely to be correct when nations are economic stable arrangements, i.e. when the rich region of a nation is not "exploited" by the poor region. When, on the other hand, it is not on the interest of a rich region to be part of a nation, attempts to achieve full economic integration among a group of nations is more likely to be successful if nations, instead of regions, are the decision makers.
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