Warum „geniale Ideen“ für wissenschaftlichen Erfolg nicht ausreichen- Überlegungen zur besonderen Ökonomik der Etablierung wissenschaftlicher Standards
Becoming famous and in the most favorable scenario winning the Nobel Prize is the dream of many young and ambitious economists. Yet, many young re-searchers are talented and only very few of them succeed to become famous in the course of their career. If we take talent for granted questions of strategy arise: Which are the basic strategic options of young scientists in the process of scientific competition? Which are the basic structural conditions influencing the outcome of strategic actions? What strategic choices should be made depending on given structural conditions? In this paper we approach these questions by drawing from an analogy between scientific para-digms and de facto standards in network industries. As in the business world, reading the market conditions is a prerequisite to developing promising scientific strategies. The typical strategy suggested by common sense reasoning, that is to concentrate on the production of truly brilliant and innovative ideas, will hardly ever bring young scien-tists’ dream come true.
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