IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfwpa/1996-060.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Fiscal Rules and the Budget Process

Author

Listed:
  • Mr. Gian M Milesi-Ferretti

Abstract

This paper examines the rationale for the imposition of fiscal rules as a way to reduce budgetary imbalances. It presents theoretical arguments for the existence of a “fiscal deficit bias” and the empirical evidence on the economic, political and institutional factors leading to this bias. In the context of these findings, it discusses the potential role of legal constraints on the level of key fiscal variables, and of reforms in budgetary procedures in enhancing fiscal discipline. It also evaluates proposals for budgetary reform in Italy.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Gian M Milesi-Ferretti, 1996. "Fiscal Rules and the Budget Process," IMF Working Papers 1996/060, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1996/060
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=2048
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mr. Guiseppe Pisauro, 2001. "Intergovernmental Relations and Fiscal Discipline: Between Commons and Soft Budget Constraints," IMF Working Papers 2001/065, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Robert A.J. Dur & Ben D. Peletier & Otto H. Swank, 1997. "The Effect of Fiscal Rules on Public Investment if Budget Deficits are Politically Motivated," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-125/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Schuknecht, Ludger, 1999. "Tying Governments' Hands in Commodity Taxation," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 8(2), pages 152-181, July.
    4. Michał Mackiewicz, 2006. "Przyczyny deficytu finansów publicznych w świetle nowej ekonomii politycznej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 1-22.
    5. Magda Kandil & Hanan Morsy, 2014. "Fiscal Stimulus and Credibility in Emerging Countries," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 420-439, June.
    6. Heiner Felix Mikosch & Silke Übelmesser, 2007. "Staatsverschuldungsunterschiede im internationalen Vergleich und Schlussfolgerungen für Deutschland," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(4), pages 309-334, November.
    7. Ebru Canikalp & Ilter Unlukaplan, 2017. "Political determinants of social expenditures in Greece: an empirical analysis," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 41(3), pages 359-377.
    8. Vikas Dixit, 2016. "Fiscal Rule and Social Sector Spending: A Study of North-East India," India Studies in Business and Economics, in: Swapnendu Banerjee & Vivekananda Mukherjee & Sushil Kumar Haldar (ed.), Understanding Development, edition 1, chapter 11, pages 155-171, Springer.
    9. Gerry Boyle; & Jim O'Leary, 1997. "Controlling Public Spending in Times of Plenty," Economics Department Working Paper Series n741197, Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
    10. A. Fatas & Mr. Atish R. Ghosh & Ugo Panizza & Mr. Andrea F Presbitero, 2019. "The Motives to Borrow," IMF Working Papers 2019/101, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Pinaki Chakraborty & Bharatee Bhusana Dash, 2017. "Fiscal Reforms, Fiscal Rule, and Development Spending: How Indian States Have Performed?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(4), pages 111-133, December.
    12. Francesco Lagona & Fabio Padovano, 2007. "A nonlinear principal component analysis of the relationship between budget rules and fiscal performance in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 401-436, March.
    13. Magazzino, Cosimo, 2009. "Wagner's law in Italy: empirical evidence from 1960 to 2008," MPRA Paper 25526, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Frank Bodmer, 2006. "The Swiss Debt Brake: How it Works and What Can Go Wrong," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 142(III), pages 307-330, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    WP; budget proposal; government resignation; finance minister; government fiscal policy decision; government policy formation; government vis-à-vis parliament; government stage; Budget planning and preparation; Government debt management;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:1996/060. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Akshay Modi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.