Disaster Policy in the US Federation: Intergovernmental Incentives and Institutional Reform
The devastation resulting from the hurricanes of 2005 could largely have been avoided at modest cost, evidence of a policy failure that may stem from misaligned incentives among levels of government. In particular, Federal government provision of ex post disaster relief means that subnational governments are not rewarded for costly but socially efficient policies that limit disaster losses. A system of Federally-mandated, state-funded disaster reserves would strengthen subnational government incentives to implement more disaster-averse policies. Illustrative calculations show that the costs of such reserves would vary widely by state but would not impose undue burdens on state fiscal systems.
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- David E. Wildasin, 2001.
"Externalities and Bailouts: Hard and Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations,"
- Wildasin, David E., 1997. "Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1843, The World Bank.
- Caplan, Arthur J. & Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 265-284, August.
- David E. Wildasin, 2006. "Disasters: Issues for State and Federal Government Finances," Working Papers 2006-07, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
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