From Pigou to Extended Liability: On the Optimal Taxation of Externalities under Imperfect Financial Markets
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- Jean Tirole, 2010. "From Pigou to Extended Liability: On the Optimal Taxation of Externalities Under Imperfect Financial Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(2), pages 697-729.
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- Ben White & Graeme J. Doole & David J. Pannell & Veronique Florec, 2012.
"Optimal environmental policy design for mine rehabilitation and pollution with a risk of non‐compliance owing to firm insolvency,"
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 56(2), pages 280-301, April.
- White, Ben & Doole, Graeme J. & Pannell, David J. & Florec, Veronique, 2012. "Optimal environmental policy design for mine rehabilitation and pollution with a risk of non-compliance owing to firm insolvency," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 56(2), June.
- Michau, Jean-Baptiste, 2015.
"Optimal labor market policy with search frictions and risk-averse workers,"
Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 93-107.
- Jean-Baptiste Michau, 2012. "Optimal labor market policy with search frictions and risk-averse workers," Working Papers hal-00757173, HAL.
- Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Moslener, Ulf, 2013. "Taxing Externalities under Financing Constraints," MPRA Paper 53855, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ben White, 2015. "Do control rights determine the optimal extension of liability to investors? The case of environmental policy for mines," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 26-52, August.
More about this item
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2008-03-25 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2008-03-25 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PUB-2008-03-25 (Public Finance)
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