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Re-Normalize, Don't New-Normalize Monetary Policy

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  • John B. Taylor

Abstract

In this paper I argue that central banks should re-normalize monetary policy, including the de facto independence of policy, rather than new-normalize policy to some so called new normal. I explain his view and show that it follows from a review of the actual practice of monetary policy in recent years. I also consider some objections that might be raised to this position. I focus mainly on the United States and go back to the time before the recent financial crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • John B. Taylor, 2014. "Re-Normalize, Don't New-Normalize Monetary Policy," Economics Working Papers 14109, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hoo:wpaper:14109
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Christopher Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2007. "The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 69-90, Fall.
    2. John B. Taylor, 2013. "Monetary Policy during the Past 30 Years with Lessons for the Next 30 Years," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 33(3), pages 333-345, Fall.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shodipe Oladimeji T. & Shobande Olatunji Abdul, 2021. "Monetary Policy Dynamics in the United States," Open Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 14-30, January.

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