Political Media Contests and Confirmatory Bias
This paper models a two-period media contest between two political candidates campaigning to win an election. Two main cases are examined. In the first case voters behave as unbiased Bayesian updaters when assessing political information. The second case considers voters suffering from confirmatory bias. In the first case I find that candidates spend equal amounts of their campaign funds in both periods in equilibrium. In the second case, candidates spend more in period one. A candidate with better media access (in period one) does, however, better if voters suﬀer from confirmatory bias than if they do not.
|Date of creation:||29 Jan 2002|
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- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1997.
"Psychology and Economics,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt8jd5z5j2, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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