Game-theoretical, Strategic forward Contracting in the Electricity Market
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- Miguel Vazquez, 2012.
"Analysis of the strategic use of forward contracting in electricity markets,"
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- Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallac, 2014. "Analysis Of The Strategic Use Of Forward Contracting In Electricity Markets," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting] 129, ANPEC - AssociaÃ§Ã£o Nacional dos Centros de PÃ³s-GraduaÃ§Ã£o em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
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More about this item
KeywordsSupply Function Equilibrium; Forward Market; Strategic Contracting; Arbitrage; Strategic Substitutes; Oligopoly; Electricity Market;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-07-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2008-07-05 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-ENE-2008-07-05 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-07-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2008-07-05 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2008-07-05 (Microeconomics)
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