Equilibrium in Search Models with Adverse Selection
This paper examines the problem of nonexistence of equilibrium in a simple search model with asymmetric information. A pure-strategy, symmetric Nash equilibrium fails to exist because adverse selection arising from steady-state considerations causes a nonconcavity in the payoff function.
|Date of creation:||Nov 1990|
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- Albrecht, James W & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1986.
"The Efficiency of Search under Competition and Monopsony,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1246-57, December.
- Albrecht, James & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1985. "The Efficiency of Search Under Competition and Monopsony," Working Papers 85-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Axel, Bo, 1977. " Search Market Equilibrium," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(1), pages 20-40.
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