Equilibrium in Search Models with Adverse Selection
This paper examines the problem of nonexistence of equilibrium in a simple search model with asymmetric information. A pure-strategy, symmetric Nash equilibrium fails to exist because adverse selection arising from steady-state considerations causes a nonconcavity in the payoff function.
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| Length: | 17 pages |
| Date of creation: | Nov 1990 |
| Handle: | RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0268 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden Phone: +46 8 665 4500 Fax: +46 8 665 4599 Web page: http://www.ifn.se/ Email: More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Albrecht, James W & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1986.
"The Efficiency of Search under Competition and Monopsony,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(6), pages 1246-1257, December.
- Albrecht, James & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1985. "The Efficiency of Search Under Competition and Monopsony," Working Papers 85-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Axel, Bo, 1977. " Search Market Equilibrium," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(1), pages 20-40. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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