Does Coordination of Immigration Policies among Destination Countries Increase Immigration?
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- Claus Aastrup Jensen & Nikolaj Malchow-Møller & Jan Rose Skaksen, 2010. "Does coordination of immigration policies among destination countries increase immigration?," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 357-384.
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- David de la Croix & Frederic Docquier, 2015.
"An Incentive Mechanism to Break the Low-skill Immigration Deadlock,"
Review of Economic Dynamics,
Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(3), pages 593-618, July.
- DE LA CROIX, David & DOCQUIER, Frédéric, 2009. "An incentive mechanism to break the low-skill immigration deadlock," CORE Discussion Papers 2009053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- David de la Croix & Frederic Docquier, 2010. "An Incentive Mechanism to Break the Low-skill Immigration Deadlock," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 1008, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
- David de la CROIX & Frederic DOCQUIER, 2009. "An Incentive Mechanism to Break the Low-skill Immigration Deadlock," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2009028, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- de la CROIX, David & DOCQUIER, Frédéric, 2014. "An incentive mechanism to break the low-skill immigration deadlock," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2655, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- David de la Croix & Frederic Docquier, 2015. "Code and data files for "An Incentive Mechanism to Break the Low-skill Immigration Deadlock"," Computer Codes 12-64, Review of Economic Dynamics.
- Slobodan Djajic & Michael S. Michael, 2009. "Temporary Migration Policies and Welfare of the Host and Source Countries: A Game-Theoretic Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 2811, CESifo Group Munich.
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- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
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