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Does Coordination of Immigration Policies among Destination Countries Increase Immigration?

Author

Listed:
  • Rose Skaksen, Jan

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Aastrup Jensen, Claus

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

Abstract

We set up a theoretical model to analyze the implications of coordination of immigration policies among destination countries. The model contains two types of spill-overs between destination countries: A terms of trade externality and a welfare policy externality. We show that while coordination unambiguously increases welfare of the destination countries, the effects on the level of immigration and on the income distribution of natives are ambiguous. Thus, coordination among destination countries does not necessarily solve the global coordination problem of inoptimally low levels of migration. Coordination, Externalities, Immigration Policy, Spill-overs, Terms of Trade, Welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Rose Skaksen, Jan & Malchow-Møller, Nikolaj & Aastrup Jensen, Claus, 2007. "Does Coordination of Immigration Policies among Destination Countries Increase Immigration?," Working Papers 15-2007, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2007_015
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    Cited by:

    1. David de la Croix & Frederic Docquier, 2015. "An Incentive Mechanism to Break the Low-skill Immigration Deadlock," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(3), pages 593-618, July.
    2. Slobodan Djajic & Michael S. Michael, 2009. "Temporary Migration Policies and Welfare of the Host and Source Countries: A Game-Theoretic Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 2811, CESifo Group Munich.

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    JEL classification:

    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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