Quota and Risk Sharing among Fishermen
Pooling and exchange of random resources may offer the owners insurance and substitution. Greater efficiency and more stable revenues thereby obtain. These good properties derive from a sharing rule that complies with the core concept from cooperative production games. It is applied here to fisheries with stochastic yield.
|Date of creation:||28 Dec 2003|
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- van Gellekom, J. R. G. & Potters, J. A. M. & Reijnierse, J. H. & Engel, M. C. & Tijs, S. H., 2000. "Characterization of the Owen Set of Linear Production Processes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 139-156, July.
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