Contraintes et choix organisationnels dans les dispositifs de monnaies sociales
Organisational choices and constraints in community or complementary currency schemes: This text discusses the organisational choices related to community or complementary currency schemes (like LETS, Argentinean trueque, Time banks, etc) by presenting a set of possibilities and their implications. The key question is that of the viability of the schemes, based on the idea that different objectives require suitable organisational choices. Two main domains are explored: first, the schemes' size and the categories of people and exchanges to be included in; second, the conditions of the issuance, the circulation and the convertibility of the currencies. Each possible option is associated with a set of constraints. The combinations of these constraints result in identifying five models of community or complementary currencies, which seem coherent compared to their objectives.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley, 2009, 80 (4), pp.547-577. <10.1111/j.1467-8292.2009.00398.x>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00709199|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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