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L'incitation des dirigeants par les plans de stock options et la performance de la firme

Author

Listed:
  • Chédli Baccouche

    (ISCAE - Université de la Manouba)

  • Hakim Ben Othman

    (UREMO - IHEC)

Abstract

L'incitation des dirigeants par les stock options peut - elle aboutir à un rapprochement des intérêts des dirigeants et des actionnaires ? et par la même agir sur la perfomance de la firme ? Cette étude porte sur un échantillon d'entreprises françaises de la SBF 120. Nous avons testé la relation entre la rémunération en stock options et la performance à travers un modèle de régressions simples, puis multiples en présence de variables de contrôle issues de la littérature en question. Les résultats des régresssions simples traduisent la non significativité de la rémunération des dirigeants par les stock options dans l'explication de la performance. Les régressions multiples montrent une amélioration du pouvoir explicatif de la perfrormance.

Suggested Citation

  • Chédli Baccouche & Hakim Ben Othman, 1999. "L'incitation des dirigeants par les plans de stock options et la performance de la firme," Post-Print halshs-00587774, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00587774
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00587774
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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