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Is it Collusion or Competition Behind Price Parallelism?: Steel Manufactoring in Greece”

Author

Listed:
  • Yannis S. Katsoulacos

    (AUEB - Athens University of Economics and Business)

  • Marc Ivaldi

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

Collusion remains a strong undercurrent of business practice despite anti-cartel enforcement being a top priority of competition authorities. Alongside active prosecution of cartels, the study of cartels is a vibrant area of research for economic and legal scholars. A challenge for both practice and scholarship is that cartels evolve, as colluding firms continuously devise new methods to circumvent competition. Cartels Diagnosed presents twelve gripping cartel case studies of collusion from key business sectors such as the airline industry, the gasoline industry, and big pharma. Written by renowned economists, these concise and accessible case studies deliver novel insights into cartel formation, facilitating practices, cartels' modus operandi, and the efficacy of cartels. Assisting in understanding new cartel mechanisms and their effects, developing new policies to deter and destabilize cartels, and measuring harm, this volume on cartel morphology is an invaluable reference for supporting public and private enforcers in detecting and prosecuting cartels. Expands the reader's knowledge of why and how cartels form, better equipping them to predict where cartels will form offers case studies of cartel practices, explaining how to detect collusion and devise policies to make them less effective. Explains how and when cartels are most effective and the harm created by collusion

Suggested Citation

  • Yannis S. Katsoulacos & Marc Ivaldi, 2025. "Is it Collusion or Competition Behind Price Parallelism?: Steel Manufactoring in Greece”," Post-Print hal-05162653, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05162653
    DOI: 10.1017/9781009428460.013
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05162653v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ross, Thomas W., 1992. "Cartel stability and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, March.
    2. John Haltiwanger & Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1991. "The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 89-106, Spring.
    3. Gasmi, F & Laffont, J J & Vuong, Q, 1992. "Econometric Analysis of Collusive Behavior in a Soft-Drink Market," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 277-311, Summer.
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