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Théorie du compromis versus Théorie du financement hiérarchique : une analyse sur un panel de PME non cotées

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  • Philippe Adair

    () (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)

Abstract

Résumé Nous testons les hypothèses relatives aux théories de la structure financière-compromis et financement hiérarchique-au regard de la fiscalité, des coûts d'agence et de l'asymétrie d'information. La variable expliquée est le taux d'endettement financier grâce à un modèle linéaire sur un panel cylindré de 2370 PME françaises observées durant la période 2002-2010. Selon nos résultats, à l'exception des garanties qui conditionnent l'accès au crédit et le crédit interentreprises qui joue un rôle de signal pour les créanciers ne disposant pas d'une information privée sur l'entreprise, la théorie du compromis est infirmée au regard de la relation entre le taux d'endettement financier et l'âge des PME ; la relation entre l'endettement et la profitabilité ainsi que les opportunités de croissance confirment la théorie du financement hiérarchique. Mots-clés : endettement, panel cylindré, PME, structure du capital, théorie du compromis, théorie du financement hiérarchique.

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  • Philippe Adair, 2014. "Théorie du compromis versus Théorie du financement hiérarchique : une analyse sur un panel de PME non cotées," Post-Print hal-01667235, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01667235
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-upec-upem.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01667235
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