Is individual rationality essential to market price formation? The contribution of zero‐intelligence agent trading models
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Other versions of this item:
- Paola Tubaro, 2009. "Is individual rationality essential to market price formation? The contribution of zero-intelligence agent trading models," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 1-19.
References listed on IDEAS
- J. Doyne Farmer & Paolo Patelli & Ilija I. Zovko, 2003. "The Predictive Power of Zero Intelligence in Financial Markets," Papers cond-mat/0309233, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2004.
- Wagner, Alfred, 1891. "Marshall's Principles of Economics," History of Economic Thought Articles, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, vol. 5, pages 319-338.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Paola Tubaro, 2011. "Computational Economics," Chapters, in: John B. Davis & D. Wade Hands (ed.),The Elgar Companion to Recent Economic Methodology, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Giuseppe Attanasi & Samuele Centorrino & Ivan Moscati, 2011. "Double Auction Equilibrium and Efficiency in a Classroom Experimental Search Market," LERNA Working Papers 11.03.337, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
- Brewer, Paul & Ratan, Anmol, 2019. "Profitability, efficiency, and inequality in double auction markets with snipers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 486-499.
- Moscati, Ivan & Tubaro, Paola, 2009. "Random behavior and the as-if defense of rational choice theory in demand experiments," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 27001, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
More about this item
Keywordsrationality assumptions; utility maximization; experimental markets; partial equilibrium; Marshallian dynamics; zero‐intelligence agents; price formation;
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