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Histoire longue : La naissance de la réglementation prudentielle, 1800-1945

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Brossard

    (LEREPS - Laboratoire d'Etude et de Recherche sur l'Economie, les Politiques et les Systèmes Sociaux - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UT - Université de Toulouse - Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Toulouse - ENSFEA - École Nationale Supérieure de Formation de l'Enseignement Agricole de Toulouse-Auzeville)

  • Hicham Chetioui

    (UPN - Université Paris Nanterre)

Abstract

Cet article a pour objectif de décrire et d'expliquer les vicissitudes de la réglementation prudentielle entre 1800 et 1945. L'analyse historique des succès et des échecs en matière de règles prudentielles permet de dégager quelques leçons pouvant éclairer les débats actuels concernant les nouveaux accords de Bâle. Nous étudions plus particulièrement quatre points importants pour la réflexion prudentielle : 1) L'évolution des règles de fonds propres, de réserves et d'assurance-dépôts aux Etats-Unis, en Angleterre et en Allemagne ; 2) La supervision bancaire privée et publique aux Etats-Unis ; 3) La discipline de marché et la discipline interbancaire aux Etats-Unis ; 4) Les caractéristiques structurelles ayant déterminé l'efficacité des règles prudentielles aux Etats-Unis, en Angleterre, en Allemagne et en France. Some lessons from history: the birth of prudential regulation between 1800 and 1945 We describe and comment the birth of prudential regulation in England, Germany, France and the United States between 1800 and 1945. We assess whether the different regulations experimented during this period were successful in preventing financial crisis. This historical analysis permits us to draw some lessons concerning different aspects of the second Basel accord. More precisely, we focus on the four following points: 1) The evolution of capital and reserve requirements and of deposit insurance schemes in the United States, in England and in Germany; 2) private and public banking supervision in the United States; 3) Market discipline in the United States; 4) Structural characteristics influencing the efficiency of prudential regulation in the United States, in England, in France and in Germany.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Brossard & Hicham Chetioui, 2003. "Histoire longue : La naissance de la réglementation prudentielle, 1800-1945," Post-Print hal-01294549, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01294549
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01294549v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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