Traitement comptable des dépenses de R&D et motivations de gestion des résultats : une étude empirique sur des entreprises françaises cotées
Accounting treatment of research and development (R&D) charges is a controversial issue since the way of taking into account those fees can sometimes be motivated by incentives to handle the final results. The results of the study are based on a sample of French companies listed and quoted in the market. Indeed this study examines the extent to which the decisions of the companies to capitalize or not the charges of the R&D can be influenced by motivations to manage earnings. The French context presents a proper area of study to check our assumptions, as the IFRS applied in France for listed companies since 2005 offer the ability of choosing between capitalizations and expensing R& D charges. By using a logistic regression model, we find out that the French listed companies tend to use the capitalization of the expenses of the R& D in order to smooth the results, as well as, to avoid any violation of the debt's restrictive clauses.
|Date of creation:||10 May 2011|
|Publication status:||Published in Comptabilités, économie et société, May 2011, Montpellier, France. pp.cd-rom, 2011|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00650590|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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