De la théorie des couts de transaction a une économie des couts de traduction -une voie de passage conceptuelle pour suivre l'émergence des dispositifs de contrôle inter-organisationnel-
Our work is an answer to Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra's appeal to go beyond transaction cost economics to study accounting and inter-organizational control. Our approach is an attempt to build a way between transaction cost economics and ANT's works in the field of economic sociology. This work emerges from a difference to take into account analyses of hybrid forms between market and hierarchy. In the 70's, TCE was only interested in the two opposed forms of governance: market and hierarchy. Williamson integrated later on the hybrid forms in the middle of the 80's. They were an answer to previous critics but not central. Our project diverges precisely on this point. On the contrary, we consider these hybrid forms as the starting point. We are interested in this place located between the market pole and the hierarchical one: the ―middle empire‖ (Latour, 2005). We think that it is the good place to follow the emergence of hybrid inter-organizational control devices. To do that, we propose the concept of translation cost. This concept is based on the notion of translation deeply rooted in ANT. The original intentions of an action are not identically transformed with neutral intermediaries (Latour, 2005). Action is transformed with mediators implicated in action. These ones generate unpredictable events. The notion of translation costs focuses on the idea that the original intentions related to the set-up of particular economic agencies are not identically transported during the ―economization‖ (Muniesa, et al., 2007, p.3) process. The work, which leads that an object gets economical, generates costs. These ones are partly ignored by Williamson's operationalization of Coase's intuition (1937). The transformation process which is at the origin of these costs is not taken into account. The contract is the only governance device taken into consideration.
|Date of creation:||10 May 2011|
|Publication status:||Published in Comptabilités, économie et société, May 2011, Montpellier, France. pp.cd-rom, 2011|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00650584|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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