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Nonpoint Source Pollution When Polluters Might Cooperate

Author

Listed:
  • Katrin Millock

    (EUREQUA - Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Francois Salanie

    (LERNA - Economie des Ressources Naturelles - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CEA - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives)

Abstract

In a model of nonpoint source pollution, we extend the theory of ambient taxes to the case when polluters might cooperate. We show that regulation through ambient taxes is severely constrained when the degree of cooperation among polluters is unknown to the regulator. On the other hand, if the regulator can invest in costly monitoring of emissions, then the optimal regulation offers a low ambient tax to cooperative groups and an optimal but costly individual emission tax to non-cooperative groups. This mechanism also has attractive properties when risk-aversion is introduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Katrin Millock & Francois Salanie, 2005. "Nonpoint Source Pollution When Polluters Might Cooperate," Post-Print hal-00270332, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00270332
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Millock, Katrin & Xabadia, Angels & Zilberman, David, 2012. "Policy for the adoption of new environmental monitoring technologies to manage stock externalities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 102-116.
    2. Katrin Millock & Angels Xabadia & David Zilberman, 2009. "Investment Policy for New Environmental Monitoring Technologies to Manage Stock Externalities," Post-Print halshs-00367888, HAL.
    3. Karp, Larry, 1998. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4z62b52k, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    4. Hamet SARR & Mohamed Ali BCHIR & François COCHARD & Anne ROZAN, 2021. "Is the “average Pigouvian tax” robust to the size of the group of polluters?," Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 285-295, September.
    5. François Cochard & Marc Willinger & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Efficiency of Nonpoint Source Pollution Instruments: An Experimental Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(4), pages 393-422, April.
    6. Wided Mattoussi & Paul Seabright, 2014. "Cooperation against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 96(1), pages 124-153.
    7. Hamet Sarr & Mohamed Ali Bchir & Francois Cochard & Anne Rozan, 2016. "Nonpoint source pollution: An experimental investigation of the Average Pigouvian Tax," Working Papers hal-01375078, HAL.
    8. Karp, Larry, 2005. "Nonpoint source pollution taxes and excessive tax burden," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt8364p7br, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    9. Lissitsa, Sabina & Chachashvili-Bolotin, Svetlana & Bokek-Cohen, Ya'arit, 2017. "Digital skills and extrinsic rewards in late career," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 46-55.
    10. Hamet SARR & Mohamed Ali BCHIR & François COCHARD & Anne ROZAN, 2016. "Nonpoint source pollution: An experimental investigation of the Average Pigouvian Tax," Working Papers 2016-05, CRESE.
    11. Mohamed Salah Matoussi & Wided Mattoussi, 2010. "On the Design of Total Water Use-Based Incentive Schemes for Sustainable Groundwater Management," Working Papers 575, Economic Research Forum, revised 12 Jan 2010.
    12. Larry Karp, 2005. "Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 229-251, June.
    13. Hansen, Lars Garn & Romstad, Eirik, 2007. "Non-point source regulation -- A self-reporting mechanism," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3-4), pages 529-537, May.
    14. Collins, Alan R. & Maille, Peter, 2008. "Farmers as Producers of Clean Water: Getting Incentive Payments Right and Encouraging Farmer Participation," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6342, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    15. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2013. "Empowering neighbors versus imposing regulations: An experimental analysis of pollution reduction schemes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 469-484.

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