Intentional Apple-choice Behaviors: When Amartya Sen Meets John Searle
This paper suggests that Amartya Sen's conception of rationality could benefit from insights borrowed to John Searle's philosophy of mind. More precisely, I argue that the work of Searle on intentionality provides a relevant conceptual apparatus to strengthen Sen's conceptualization of context-dependent preferences in a way that suggests further analytical contributions to the latter’s line of research. The arguments developed in the paper are relevant for three interrelated issues on economic rationality that are currently discussed in economic methodology: (1) methodological dualism and intentionalitic explanations in economics, (2) the relationships between economics and philosophy, and (3) the recent rise of behavioral economics within the mainstream of economic theory.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in Cahiers d'Economie politique|
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- L. Randall Wray & Stephanie Bell, 2004. "Introduction," Chapters, in: Credit and State Theories of Money, chapter 1 Edward Elgar.
- Sen, Amartya K, 1973. "Behaviour and the Concept of Preference," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 40(159), pages 241-59, August.
- Matthias Klaes, 2006. "Rationality and its bounds: Re-framing social framing," SCEME Working Papers: Advances in Economic Methodology 012/2006, SCEME.
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