Tracing Fairness Intentions: Chinese Whisper
The paper aims at defining the role of intentions for reciprocity. The ultimatum game is modified, by adding a kind of randomizer (“Chinese Whisper”), to generate outcomes which are not intended und thus to separate the proposers’ initial intentions from their actual offers. The mechanism ensures that the responder reacts to changing intentions and not to changing outcomes. This experimental approach also has the advantage that the number of available options for the proposer is not limited. Our evidence supports the view that fairness theory should explicitly address intentions – responders exhibit different acceptance rates depending on the intentions of proposers.
|Date of creation:||25 Feb 2008|
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- Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Renner, Elke, 2000.
"The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 265-277, June.
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- Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs, 2008.
"Testing theories of fairness--Intentions matter,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 287-303, January.
- Blount, Sally, 1995. "When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 131-144, August.
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