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Tracing Fairness Intentions: Chinese Whisper

  • Zulia Gubaydullina

    ()

    (University of Göttingen)

  • Kilian Bizer

    ()

    (University of Göttingen)

Registered author(s):

    The paper aims at defining the role of intentions for reciprocity. The ultimatum game is modified, by adding a kind of randomizer (“Chinese Whisper”), to generate outcomes which are not intended und thus to separate the proposers’ initial intentions from their actual offers. The mechanism ensures that the responder reacts to changing intentions and not to changing outcomes. This experimental approach also has the advantage that the number of available options for the proposer is not limited. Our evidence supports the view that fairness theory should explicitly address intentions – responders exhibit different acceptance rates depending on the intentions of proposers.

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    File URL: http://www2.vwl.wiso.uni-goettingen.de/departmentpaper/No_135.pdf
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    Paper provided by University of Goettingen, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Discussion Papers with number 135.

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    Length: 14 pages
    Date of creation: 25 Feb 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:got:vwldps:135
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3 - D-37073 Göttingen
    Web page: http://www.economics.uni-goettingen.de

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    1. Abbink, Klaus & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 1997. "The Moonlighting Game - An Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution," Discussion Paper Serie B 415, University of Bonn, Germany.
    2. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions Matter," IEW - Working Papers 063, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Blount, Sally, 1995. "When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 131-144, August.
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