Monopsony and Time-Consistency : Sustainable Pricing Policies for Perennial Grops
Since farmers in developing countries must make sunk investments to produce perennial crops, governments, in the guise of state-run marketing boards, face constraints on maximal sustainable price which can be charged by a marketing board assuming that "punishments" involve reversion to subsistence by untrusting farmers. This maximal price balances concerns about revenue extraction against the incentive of governments to cheat by capitalizing on sunk investments. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1992|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (609) 258-4800
Web page: http://www.wws.princeton.edu/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:priwds:159. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.