Monopsony and Time-Consistency: Sustainable Pricing Policies for Perennial Crops
Since farmers in developing countries must make sunk investments to produce perennial crops, governments, in the guise of state-run marketing boards, face constraints on maximal sustainable price which can be charged by a marketing board assuming that "punishments" involve reversion to subsistence by untrusting farmers. This maximal price balances concerns about revenue extraction against the incentive of governments to cheat by capitalizing on sunk investments. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Volume (Year): 1 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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